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Background
The United States is approaching the 21st century with it's space launch
community providing only 1960 technology systems with unimpressive
success records and with serious deficiencies in operational responsiveness
and commercial viability.
The current expendable systems have
demonstrated launch success ratios of 0.85 to 0.95 with launch costs two to
five times higher than the world class competition. The present U.S. Space
Launch Infrastructure cannot support achievement of our National Space
goals for Defense, Space Communication, SSF Logistics, and Exploration.
Over the past 10 years, we have witnessed our share of the commercial
satellites launched dwindle from 100% to less than 25%. We recovered
from a series of major launch failures in the mid '80's but have been
plagued again in '91 and '92 with major launch system failures.
This environment creates a spiral that keeps our launch systems in a state
of "limbo" or no change (see figure 1). Since it is so expensive to operate
our current fleet of launch systems, it rolls up to very high cost space
programs. This prevents us from starting new programs, resulting in less
payloads, which feed the rationale to keep our existing fleet. This death
spiral must be broken in order for the U.S. to regain its lead in the world
launch vehicle market.
These non-complementary efforts by DoD and NASA were further confused
by the national Aerospace Plane (NASP) and SDIOs Single Stage to Orbit
programs causing Congress to cancel the NLS program in their 1993
deliberations. They have asked that agencies return this spring with an
affordable National Strategy which accommodates real and documented
needs.
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Future Choices
The nation has several options to pursue all with significant consequences
(see figure 2). They are; (1) Do Nothing - This temptation to do nothing
is strong, however the long term DoD/NASA cost penalty is large and we
will find ourselves out of the commercial space launch business in the next
decade; (2) Upgrade the current systems - The current family (Shuttle,
Titan, Atlas, Delta, etc.) can be upgraded/enhanced but will still carry the
high cost and poor operational features of the 1960/1970 technology. The
end result is that we can spend a significant amount of money in
upgrading these systems and still end up being non-competitive in
comparison to newly developed foreign systems in the next decade; (3)
Develop Separate NASA and Air Force Vehicles - Proceed with separate
developments by NASA and the Air Force - NASA to focus on a heavy lift
vehicle or Shuttle replacement for eventual manned exploration and the
Air Force to focus on a single vehicle to replace the Titan/Atlas/Delta.
Share common development articles where efficient (e.g., engines, upper
stages, avionics). The NLS program was moving in this direction just prior
to Congressional cancellation; (4) Leap-frog to a fully recoverable Space
Plane - One need only watch a normal launch of a large existing booster
and the associated "loss" of expensive expendable hardware to envision the
possible benefits of a fully recoverable SSTO, NASP, HSCT, etc. The
temptation is to jump ahead to achieve the very low cost per flight
numbers that proponents of these systems project. In reality, technology
is not available in the near term, the up front development costs are very
high (3 to 4 times the costs of more conventional booster systems) and the
low cost per flight numbers are feasible only with very high traffic rates well in excess of the current projections for the 2000 to 2020 time period;
(5) Build a 20-50K NLSISpacelifter - Develop a highly reliable system
that will be an economic break-thru for the space launch business in the
same way that the 707 paved the way for the air transport business.
Provide the dependability, responsiveness, and commercially attractive
features to dominate the space launch business in the next century. Build
the system initially as an unmanned launch vehicle replacement for
Titan/Atlas and use these initial missions to verify the system as a
manned launch vehicle. Develop a parallel PLS/upper stand and CRTV to
enable the phaseout of the Shuttle.
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Proposed Solution
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Boeing has participated in numerous government contract studies and
independently examined many launch system alternatives over the last
eight years. There are two hard conclusions that have repeatedly been
reached in all these studies as well as reinforced by our experience with
commercial airplanes:
(1) A new launch system must offer a major
improvement in launch reliability. The true cost of failure measured in
monetary and non-monetary and non-monetary terms make 99+%
reliability a key and obtainable goal of a new launch system (see figures 3
& 4); (2) Launch costs must be drastically reduced while maintaining a n
affordable development cost. The single most significant means to reduce
the cost per launch is to recover and reuse high value hardware elements
("See figure 5). The most effective means of minimizing development cost
is to develop a single "core vehicle" with modular elements that can be
integrated to form launch vehicles of varying payload capacities
(see
figure 6). By developing a system that meets these two "goals", we also
achieve the desired improvements in dependability, operational features,
responsiveness, commercial development risk reduction. For example:
•

High reliability and low cost per launch bring commercial viability
and world class competitiveness along with a major reduction in total
cost of launch (i.e., reduced cost of failure).

•

Recovery/reuse of high value elements makes the technology of
automated vehicle health monitoring affordable, which enables
improvements in operability, dependability, and responsiveness.

•

Recover/reuse of the engine the cost per flight and also makes the
total system less sensitive to the per unit cost risk of the engine since
an increase in engine cost of 50 or even 100% is reduced by a factor
of 8-10 reuse.

The system solution is summarized in figure 7.
The following are additional features and benefits of our recommended
solution:
•

Recover/reuse of high value hardware can reduce the cost per launch
by 47% compared to expendable launch systems.
The 2% non
recurring cost penalty is paid back within two flights. This results in
a projected life cycle cost savings of multi-billion dollars compared to
a conventional expendable launch vehicle system.
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•

High reliability requires adoption of an "engine out" operating
philosophy. Just as with modern transport aircraft that are designed
to "fail safe" with one engine out, so must the modern space launch
system be able to successfully complete its mission with one engine
failed.
This is mandatory for a multi-engine launch vehicle to
achieve high reliability levels.

• No new engine development is necessary although the STME could be
phased-in in the future for additional cost reduction. Use of the
SSME LO2/LH2 engines provides high performance without
environmental issue.
•

Modular redundant systems are cost effective when systems are
recovered and reused and thus the "minimum equipment list"
philosophy used in the aircraft industry is also viable for the space
launch business.
This enables highly dependable/high responsive
launch operations. Space launch operations finally become "routine
and uneventful" just as our airline operations have become.

•

The proposed system solution meets the program goals using today's
demonstrated technologies.
No advanced technology risk is
necessary.

Supporting Rationale
The requirements and the mission model have been validated.
The
government and industry have spent $500M and 6 years of effort by our
top engineering teams to identify system architectural options and resolve
the technical issues. The technical base is firm.

• Feasibility of recovery has been demonstrated in a technology risk
mitigation program which was structured to address each issue in
question. The last page of this presentation is a summary of the 10minute video of the Advanced Development Program (ADP) which
validated the Propulsion Module Recovery/Reuse Concept.
Conservative cost analysis based upon Shuttle derived actual costs
for recovery/refurbishment operations.
•

Recovery concept based upon proven Apollo approach.
technology issues involved.
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The Reliability Solution
Fault tolerant design to prevent failures
Demonstrate reliability before flight
• Cannot be done with solids
Performance margin on vehicle design
Example of fault tolerance avionics & subsystems
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With fault tolerant propulsion 99+ reliability achievable
Make all subsystems fault tolerant - including engines
Figure 4
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Proposed National Spacelift Program
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Conclusion
The Government team must show that the program can be accomplished
without major increase in the NASA/DoD budget.
The savings by
transitioning from the Titan, Atlas and Shuttle systems will off-set the
development cost of the system. The potential for contractor cost sharing
by establishing incentives to invest such as investment tax credits, or the
allowance of interest costs should be examined to encourage commercial
participation.
The Government must show that the development of the partially reusable
system is the natural evolution toward the fully reusable advanced
generation solution. As the traffic expands and the technology matures,
the "space plane" becomes the evolutionary result.

The partially recoverable, modular system offers the technical
and operational innovations, dramatic cost reductions and high
reliability that will be enthusiastically supported by Congress
and the general public.
The studies have been done.
The
system is ready to go into DEM/VAL.
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Propulsion Module Recovery ADP Results
Reentry Aero/Aerothermal Tests: 57 hypersonic wind tunnel aerothermal test runs were made in which paint melt, oil flow
and shadowgraph data were gathered. Heating data were used to define requirements for an ablative thermal protection
system. 204 hypersonic and transonic aerodynamic wind tunnel runs were made in which force and moment, Schlieren and oil
flow data were gathered. Tests proved the module to be aerodynamically stable and controllable.
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Water Landing & Seakeepinq Tests : Water landing was initially studied
with a computer simulation model which incorporated hydrodynamic
impact theory. A subscale test program was subsequently conducted in a
tank basin which included 60 drop tests with a full range of landing
velocities and attitudes. Drops were made on both waves and calm
water. Relatively low immersion depths and water spray loads confirmed
that a deployable, lightweight, engine spray shield was feasible.
Seakeeping tests in severe seas showed the module to be a stable,
seaworthy configuration. Landing stability is enhanced and impact loads
are minimized by using a proper parachute hang angle. Load and shock
environment levels are less critical than other typical flight environments
for launch vehicle equipment. Tipover rates were estimated at less than
2% for the wave and wind conditions in the recovery area.
Ocean Recovery Operations Tests : Validation of an ocean recovery
approach was accomplished by a progression of concept studies, design,
subscale model basin tests and open ocean recovery operations. System
criteria were used to evaluate numerous concepts. The primary concept
chosen for development was a buoyant ramp. The buoyant ramp is
designed to provide compensation of wave induced motions between the
propulsion module and the ship, thus, allowing an easy retrival of the
module up the ramp and onto the ship. Recovery of the module with the
ramp requires only onboard ship operations with a small crew. Subscale
model basin recovery testing was performed and consistied of 200
individual tests with a full range of simulated wave and wind environments.
Recovery development culminated with 1/2 scale open ocean tests.
Testing at 1/2 scale provided a realistic simulation of full scale recovery
operations including crew and shipboard equipment interfaces. A 140 foot
recovery ship was used with a 1/2 scale module. A series of towing,
messenger line snare and recovery tests were performed. The final stage
of the 1/2 scale recovery tests consisted of rough water recoveries with a
buoyant ramp design based on model basin test results. Over 20 routine
recoveries were performed in rough seas with waves to 12 feet high.

Test results provide high stabilty and low impact loads
with use of parachute harness hang angle
• Simulation
Test Data
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Tipover
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